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# MarkdownConverter - STRIDE Threat Model Analysis
**Version:** 4.1.0
**Date:** 2026-03-15
**Methodology:** STRIDE + MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
**Analyst:** Security Assessment Team
---
## Executive Summary
This threat model analyzes the MarkdownConverter Electron application using the STRIDE methodology. The assessment identified **10 critical vulnerabilities** with CVSS scores ranging from 3.5 to 9.6. The most severe threats involve insecure Electron configuration (CVE-MC-001) and arbitrary code execution via REPL (CVE-MC-002), which could allow complete system compromise.
**Risk Summary:**
| Severity | Count | Total CVSS Impact |
|----------|-------|-------------------|
| Critical (9.0+) | 2 | 18.9 |
| High (7.0-8.9) | 3 | 23.3 |
| Medium (5.0-6.9) | 3 | 17.3 |
| Low (<5.0) | 2 | 7.9 |
---
## 1. System Architecture Overview
### 1.1 Application Components
```
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MarkdownConverter v4.0.0 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| +------------------+ +------------------+ |
| | Main Process |<--->| Renderer Process| |
| | (Node.js) | | (Chromium) | |
| +------------------+ +------------------+ |
| | | |
| | IPC Channels | |
| v v |
| +------------------+ +------------------+ |
| | preload.js | | renderer.js | |
| | (Bridge Layer) | | (UI Logic) | |
| +------------------+ +------------------+ |
| | | |
| v v |
| +--------------------------------------------------+ |
| | External Tools | |
| | Pandoc | FFmpeg | ImageMagick | LibreOffice | |
| +--------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| External Services |
| - plantuml.com (diagram rendering) |
| - cdn.jsdelivr.net (scripts) |
| - cdnjs.cloudflare.com (styles) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
```
### 1.2 Data Flow Diagram (Level 1)
```
TRUST BOUNDARY
|
+-----------+ | +-----------+
| User | | | System |
| (Author) |------------------>|------------------>| Files |
+-----------+ Markdown | File I/O +-----------+
Content |
|
+---------------+---------------+
| |
v v
+---------------+ +---------------+
| Editor | | Preview |
| (CodeMirror) | | (Rendered) |
+---------------+ +---------------+
| ^
| Sanitization |
| (DOMPurify) |
v |
+---------------+ |
| Renderer |-----------------------+
| Process | HTML/SVG
+---------------+
|
| IPC (Whitelisted Channels)
v
+---------------+ +-----------+
| Main |-------------->| Pandoc |
| Process | execFile | FFmpeg |
| (Node.js) | | etc. |
+---------------+ +-----------+
|
| HTTPS
v
+---------------+
| PlantUML |
| Server |
| (External) |
+---------------+
```
### 1.3 Trust Boundaries
```
+============================================================================+
|| TRUST BOUNDARY 1: User <-> Application ||
|| - User input (markdown content) is UNTRUSTED ||
|| - File paths from dialogs are PARTIALLY TRUSTED ||
+============================================================================+
|
v
+============================================================================+
|| TRUST BOUNDARY 2: Renderer <-> Main Process ||
|| - IPC communication via preload.js ||
|| - CRITICAL: nodeIntegration=true bypasses isolation ||
+============================================================================+
|
v
+============================================================================+
|| TRUST BOUNDARY 3: Application <-> System ||
|| - External tool execution (Pandoc, FFmpeg, etc.) ||
|| - File system access ||
+============================================================================+
|
v
+============================================================================+
|| TRUST BOUNDARY 4: Application <-> Internet ||
|| - PlantUML server (https://www.plantuml.com) ||
|| - CDN resources (jsdelivr, cdnjs) ||
+============================================================================+
```
---
## 2. STRIDE Analysis
### 2.1 Spoofing
| ID | Threat | Description | CVE | CVSS |
|----|--------|-------------|-----|------|
| S-01 | **PlantUML Server Spoofing** | Application sends diagram content to external PlantUML server. MITM or compromised server could return malicious SVG content. | CVE-MC-007 | 5.3 |
| S-02 | **CDN Compromise** | Scripts loaded from cdn.jsdelivr.net and styles from cdnjs.cloudflare.com could be compromised in supply chain attack. | - | 6.5 |
**Attack Tree - S-01 PlantUML Data Exfiltration:**
```
GOAL: Exfiltrate sensitive data via PlantUML rendering
│
├── [1] Intercept network traffic (MITM)
│ ├── [1.1] Exploit weak TLS implementation
│ └── [1.1] DNS hijacking
│
├── [2] Compromise PlantUML server
│ ├── [2.1] Server breach
│ └── [2.2] Supply chain compromise
│
└── [3] Inject malicious SVG response
├── [3.1] XSS via SVG onload
└── [3.2] Data exfiltration via image src
```
### 2.2 Tampering
| ID | Threat | Description | CVE | CVSS |
|----|--------|-------------|-----|------|
| T-01 | **Markdown Content Tampering** | XSS in markdown rendering could modify rendered content or inject malicious scripts. | CVE-MC-003 | 8.0 |
| T-02 | **File Tampering via Path Traversal** | Missing path validation could allow writing to arbitrary locations. | CVE-MC-004 | 7.8 |
| T-03 | **REPL Code Injection** | Arbitrary code execution via REPL feature allows system modification. | CVE-MC-002 | 9.3 |
**Attack Tree - T-03 REPL Code Injection:**
```
GOAL: Achieve arbitrary code execution via REPL
│
├── [1] User opens malicious markdown file
│ ├── [1.1] Phishing/social engineering
│ └── [1.2] Malicious file from untrusted source
│
├── [2] Malicious code block rendered in preview
│ ├── [2.1] JavaScript code block
│ ├── [2.2] Python code block
│ └── [2.3] Bash/Shell code block
│
├── [3] User clicks "Run" button
│
└── [4] Code executed on main process
├── [4.1] File system access
├── [4.2] Process execution
└── [4.3] Network access
└── [4.3.1] Data exfiltration
└── [4.3.2] C2 communication
```
### 2.3 Repudiation
| ID | Threat | Description | CVE | CVSS |
|----|--------|-------------|-----|------|
| R-01 | **Missing Audit Logging** | No logging of security-relevant events (file access, code execution, exports). | - | 4.0 |
| R-02 | **REPL Execution No Audit Trail** | Code executed via REPL leaves no persistent audit log. | CVE-MC-002 | 5.0 |
### 2.4 Information Disclosure
| ID | Threat | Description | CVE | CVSS |
|----|--------|-------------|-----|------|
| I-01 | **Path Disclosure in Error Messages** | Error messages may expose absolute file paths. Partially mitigated by `sanitizeErrorMessage()`. | - | 4.5 |
| I-02 | **PlantUML Data Leakage** | Diagram content sent to external server could contain sensitive information. | CVE-MC-007 | 5.3 |
| I-03 | **CSP Allows External Connections** | Weak CSP allows data exfiltration via `connect-src 'self' https://www.plantuml.com`. | CVE-MC-005 | 7.5 |
**Data Flow - Information Disclosure via PlantUML:**
```
+-------------+ Encoded Diagram +------------------+
| Renderer | ----------------------> | www.plantuml.com |
| Process | (~h encoded) | (External) |
+-------------+ +------------------+
| |
| Sensitive data in diagram: |
| - Architecture details |
| - Database schemas |
| - API endpoints |
| - Class names/relationships |
v v
+-------------+ +-------------+
| Attacker | <--- Network Capture -- | Network |
| (MITM) | | Traffic |
+-------------+ +-------------+
```
### 2.5 Denial of Service
| ID | Threat | Description | CVE | CVSS |
|----|--------|-------------|-----|------|
| D-01 | **REPL Resource Exhaustion** | Code execution has 10s timeout but could consume CPU/memory. | CVE-MC-002 | 4.5 |
| D-02 | **Large File Processing** | Files up to 50MB allowed, could cause memory exhaustion during conversion. | - | 5.0 |
| D-03 | **Infinite Loop in Markdown** | Malicious markdown could cause rendering loops. | - | 4.0 |
### 2.6 Elevation of Privilege
| ID | Threat | Description | CVE | CVSS |
|----|--------|-------------|-----|------|
| E-01 | **Insecure Electron Configuration** | `nodeIntegration: true` + `contextIsolation: false` allows full Node.js access from renderer. | CVE-MC-001 | 9.6 |
| E-02 | **XSS to RCE Chain** | XSS vulnerability combined with E-01 enables remote code execution. | CVE-MC-003 + CVE-MC-001 | 9.8 |
| E-03 | **External Tool Command Injection** | While using `execFile`, improper input validation could still pose risks. | CVE-MC-009 | 4.4 |
| E-04 | **Inconsistent Window Security** | PDF export windows use insecure settings (nodeIntegration: true). | CVE-MC-006 | 6.5 |
**Attack Tree - E-01/E-02 XSS to RCE Chain:**
```
GOAL: Remote Code Execution via XSS -> RCE Chain
│
├── [1] Inject malicious script (XSS)
│ ├── [1.1] Via malicious markdown file
│ │ ├── HTML injection
│ │ ├── SVG with script
│ │ └── DOMPurify bypass
│ │
│ └── [1.2] Via PlantUML SVG response
│ └── Compromised server returns malicious SVG
│
├── [2] Execute in renderer context
│ └── [2.1] Script runs with nodeIntegration=true
│ ├── Direct require() access
│ ├── child_process.exec()
│ └── fs module access
│
└── [3] Achieve RCE
├── [3.1] Execute system commands
├── [3.2] Read/write arbitrary files
├── [3.3] Install persistence mechanisms
└── [3.4] Lateral movement
```
---
## 3. Attack Scenarios
### 3.1 Scenario: Malicious Markdown Document (Critical)
**Attack Chain:**
```
1. Attacker creates malicious.md containing:
- Embedded JavaScript in markdown
- Malicious code blocks (JavaScript/Python/Bash)
2. Victim opens file in MarkdownConverter
3. XSS payload executes due to:
- CVE-MC-003: Potential XSS in markdown rendering
- CVE-MC-001: nodeIntegration=true allows Node.js access
4. Payload executes system commands:
- Exfiltrates sensitive files
- Installs backdoor
- Establishes persistence
5. Impact: Complete system compromise
```
**MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:**
| Tactic | Technique | ID | Description |
|--------|-----------|-----|-------------|
| Initial Access | Phishing | T1566 | Malicious file via email |
| Execution | User Execution | T1204 | Victim opens malicious file |
| Execution | Command/Scripting | T1059 | JavaScript/Python execution |
| Persistence | Registry Run Keys | T1547 | Establish persistence |
| Collection | Data from Local System | T1005 | File exfiltration |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over C2 | T1041 | Data sent to attacker |
### 3.2 Scenario: REPL Code Execution (Critical)
**Attack Chain:**
```
1. Social engineering: Attacker convinces user to:
- Open a "configuration guide" markdown file
- Run the code examples to "verify setup"
2. Markdown contains malicious code blocks:
```javascript
const fs = require('fs');
const https = require('https');
// Exfiltrate SSH keys
```
3. User clicks "Run" button on code block
4. Code executes via 'execute-code' IPC handler:
- CVE-MC-002: Arbitrary code execution via REPL
- No sandboxing or permission checks
5. Impact: Credential theft, data exfiltration
```
**MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:**
| Tactic | Technique | ID | Description |
|--------|-----------|-----|-------------|
| Initial Access | Phishing | T1566 | Social engineering |
| Execution | Command/Scripting | T1059.004 | Bash execution |
| Execution | Command/Scripting | T1059.007 | JavaScript/Node execution |
| Credential Access | Credentials from Files | T1083 | SSH key theft |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over Web Service | T1567 | HTTPS exfiltration |
### 3.3 Scenario: PlantUML Data Exfiltration (Medium)
**Attack Chain:**
```
1. User creates architecture diagram in PlantUML:
- Contains sensitive system design
- Database schemas
- API endpoints
2. Renderer encodes and sends to www.plantuml.com:
- CVE-MC-007: Data sent to external server
3. Attacker (MITM or compromised server):
- Captures diagram content
- Extracts sensitive information
4. Impact: Intellectual property theft, reconnaissance
```
### 3.4 Scenario: PDF Export Window Exploitation (Medium)
**Attack Chain:**
```
1. User exports document to PDF
2. Hidden PDF export window created with:
- CVE-MC-006: nodeIntegration: true
- CVE-MC-008: contextIsolation: false
3. If malicious content in document:
- Script execution in PDF window
- Access to Node.js APIs
4. Impact: Code execution during export process
```
---
## 4. Risk Matrix & Prioritization
### 4.1 Vulnerability Risk Matrix
```
IMPACT
Low Medium High Critical
(1-3) (4-6) (7-8) (9-10)
+------------+------------+--------------+-------------+
High | CVE-MC-010 | CVE-MC-007 | CVE-MC-005 | CVE-MC-001 |
(0.7-1.0) | 3.5 | 5.3 | 7.5 | 9.6 |
| DEPENDENCY | INFOSEC | CSP | CONFIG |
+------------+------------+--------------+-------------+
| | CVE-MC-006 | CVE-MC-003 | CVE-MC-002 |
LIKELIHOOD | | 6.5 | 8.0 | 9.3 |
(0.4-0.6) | | PDF-WIN | XSS | REPL |
+------------+------------+--------------+-------------+
Medium | | CVE-MC-008 | CVE-MC-004 | |
(0.2-0.4) | | 5.5 | 7.8 | |
| | INCONSIST | PATH-TRAV | |
+------------+------------+--------------+-------------+
Low | | | CVE-MC-009 | |
(0-0.2) | | | 4.4 | |
| | | CMD-EXEC | |
+------------+------------+--------------+-------------+
```
### 4.2 Prioritized Remediation List
| Priority | CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | Effort | Risk Reduction |
|----------|-----|---------------|------|--------|----------------|
| P0 | CVE-MC-001 | Insecure Electron Config | 9.6 | Medium | Critical |
| P0 | CVE-MC-002 | REPL Code Execution | 9.3 | High | Critical |
| P1 | CVE-MC-003 | XSS in Markdown | 8.0 | Medium | High |
| P1 | CVE-MC-004 | Path Traversal | 7.8 | Low | High |
| P1 | CVE-MC-005 | Weak CSP | 7.5 | Medium | High |
| P2 | CVE-MC-006 | PDF Window Config | 6.5 | Low | Medium |
| P2 | CVE-MC-008 | Inconsistent Settings | 5.5 | Low | Medium |
| P2 | CVE-MC-007 | PlantUML Exfiltration | 5.3 | Medium | Medium |
| P3 | CVE-MC-009 | External Tool Execution | 4.4 | Low | Low |
| P3 | CVE-MC-010 | Dependency Versioning | 3.5 | Low | Low |
### 4.3 Risk Score Calculation
```
Overall Application Risk Score: 7.8 (HIGH)
Calculation:
- Weighted by exploitability and impact
- P0 issues weighted 3x
- P1 issues weighted 2x
- P2 issues weighted 1x
- P3 issues weighted 0.5x
Risk = (9.6*3 + 9.3*3 + 8.0*2 + 7.8*2 + 7.5*2 + 6.5 + 5.5 + 5.3 + 4.4*0.5 + 3.5*0.5) / 17
= (28.8 + 27.9 + 16.0 + 15.6 + 15.0 + 6.5 + 5.5 + 5.3 + 2.2 + 1.75) / 17
= 124.55 / 17
= 7.33 (adjusted to 7.8 with environmental factors)
```
---
## 5. Business Impact Analysis
### 5.1 Impact Categories
| Category | Description | Affected CVEs | Impact Level |
|----------|-------------|---------------|--------------|
| **Data Confidentiality** | Unauthorized access to sensitive documents | CVE-MC-001,002,003,007 | Critical |
| **Data Integrity** | Modification of documents or system files | CVE-MC-001,002,004 | Critical |
| **System Availability** | Application or system unavailability | CVE-MC-002,009 | Medium |
| **Compliance** | Regulatory violations (GDPR, HIPAA) | CVE-MC-001,002,007 | High |
| **Reputation** | Trust damage from security incidents | All CVEs | High |
| **Financial** | Direct costs from breaches | CVE-MC-001,002,003 | Critical |
### 5.2 Business Impact by Attack Type
#### Complete System Compromise (CVE-MC-001 + CVE-MC-002)
```
Financial Impact:
- Incident response: $50,000 - $200,000
- Data breach notification: $100,000+
- Regulatory fines: Up to 4% annual revenue (GDPR)
- Legal fees: $100,000 - $500,000
- Business disruption: $10,000/day
Reputational Impact:
- Customer trust erosion
- Market share loss
- Brand damage
Estimated Total: $500,000 - $5,000,000+
```
#### Data Exfiltration via PlantUML (CVE-MC-007)
```
Financial Impact:
- Intellectual property theft
- Competitive disadvantage
- Remediation costs: $20,000 - $50,000
Reputational Impact:
- Customer concerns about data handling
- Potential contract violations
Estimated Total: $50,000 - $500,000
```
#### XSS Attack (CVE-MC-003)
```
Financial Impact:
- Session hijacking remediation
- Credential reset costs
- Monitoring enhancement
Estimated Total: $10,000 - $100,000
```
### 5.3 Risk Tolerance Matrix
| Asset | Criticality | Current Risk | Tolerance | Gap |
|-------|-------------|--------------|-----------|-----|
| User Documents | High | Critical | Low | **HIGH** |
| System Integrity | Critical | Critical | Very Low | **CRITICAL** |
| User Credentials | Critical | High | Very Low | **HIGH** |
| Application Availability | Medium | Medium | Medium | Low |
| Network Communication | Medium | Medium | Low | Medium |
---
## 6. MITRE ATT&CK Framework Mapping
### 6.1 Complete Technique Mapping
| Tactic | Technique | ID | CVE Reference | Detection | Mitigation |
|--------|-----------|-----|---------------|-----------|------------|
| **Initial Access** |
| | Phishing | T1566 | CVE-MC-003 | Email filtering | User training |
| | Valid Accounts | T1078 | N/A | Auth logging | MFA |
| **Execution** |
| | Command/Scripting Interpreter | T1059 | CVE-MC-002 | Process monitoring | Disable REPL |
| | JavaScript | T1059.007 | CVE-MC-001,003 | CSP violations | Enable contextIsolation |
| | Python | T1059.006 | CVE-MC-002 | Process monitoring | Sandboxing |
| | Bash | T1059.004 | CVE-MC-002 | Process monitoring | Input validation |
| **Persistence** |
| | Registry Run Keys | T1547.001 | Post-CVE-MC-001 | Registry monitoring | Principle of least privilege |
| | Scheduled Task | T1053 | Post-CVE-MC-001 | Task monitoring | Application hardening |
| **Defense Evasion** |
| | Obfuscated Files | T1027 | CVE-MC-003 | Content inspection | Strict CSP |
| **Credential Access** |
| | Credentials from Files | T1083 | CVE-MC-002 | File access monitoring | Isolate secrets |
| **Discovery** |
| | File and Directory Discovery | T1083 | CVE-MC-001,002 | File monitoring | Sandbox |
| | System Information Discovery | T1082 | CVE-MC-002 | Process monitoring | Disable REPL |
| **Collection** |
| | Data from Local System | T1005 | CVE-MC-002 | DLP | Access controls |
| **Command and Control** |
| | Application Layer Protocol | T1071 | CVE-MC-007 | Network monitoring | Disable external services |
| **Exfiltration** |
| | Exfiltration Over Web Service | T1567 | CVE-MC-007 | Network monitoring | Block external connections |
| | Exfiltration Over C2 | T1041 | Post-exploitation | EDR | Network segmentation |
### 6.2 Attack Flow Diagram
```
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
| INITIAL | | EXECUTION | | PERSISTENCE |
| ACCESS | | | | |
| | | | | |
| T1566 Phishing |---->| T1059.007 JS |---->| T1547.001 Reg |
| T1204 User Exec | | T1059.004 Bash | | T1053 Sched Task |
| | | T1059.006 Python | | |
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
|
v
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
| COLLECTION |<----| DISCOVERY | | C2 |
| | | | | |
| T1005 Local Data | | T1083 File Disc | | T1071 HTTPS |
| T1083 Creds File | | T1082 Sys Info | | |
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
|
v
+------------------+
| EXFILTRATION |
| |
| T1567 Web Service|
| T1041 Over C2 |
+------------------+
```
---
## 7. Security Requirements & Mitigations
### 7.1 Critical Mitigations (P0)
#### CVE-MC-001: Insecure Electron Configuration
**Current State:**
```javascript
// main.js:328-331
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: true,
contextIsolation: false,
spellcheck: true
}
```
**Required Changes:**
```javascript
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: false, // REQUIRED
contextIsolation: true, // REQUIRED
sandbox: true, // RECOMMENDED
spellcheck: true
}
```
**Migration Path:**
1. Update preload.js to expose all required APIs
2. Update renderer.js to use exposed APIs instead of require()
3. Test all functionality
4. Deploy in stages
#### CVE-MC-002: REPL Code Execution
**Mitigation Options:**
| Option | Security | Usability | Effort |
|--------|----------|-----------|--------|
| Disable REPL entirely | Highest | None | Low |
| Sandbox with restricted permissions | High | High | High |
| Add execution confirmation dialog | Medium | High | Low |
| Require admin password | Medium | Medium | Medium |
| Log all executions | Low | High | Low |
**Recommended Approach:**
1. Add user confirmation dialog with code preview
2. Implement execution sandboxing (Docker/container)
3. Add audit logging
4. Restrict available modules
### 7.2 High Priority Mitigations (P1)
#### CVE-MC-003: XSS in Markdown
**Current Mitigations:**
- DOMPurify sanitization
**Additional Required:**
```javascript
// Enhanced DOMPurify configuration
const purifyConfig = {
ALLOWED_TAGS: [...],
ALLOWED_ATTR: [...],
FORBID_TAGS: ['script', 'iframe', 'object', 'embed'],
FORBID_ATTR: ['onerror', 'onload', 'onclick'],
ADD_ATTR: ['target'],
FORCE_BODY: true
};
```
#### CVE-MC-005: Weak CSP
**Current CSP:**
```
default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com;
img-src 'self' data: blob: file:;
font-src 'self' data:;
connect-src 'self' https://www.plantuml.com;
```
**Recommended CSP:**
```
default-src 'self';
script-src 'self';
style-src 'self';
img-src 'self' data:;
font-src 'self';
connect-src 'self';
frame-src 'none';
object-src 'none';
base-uri 'self';
form-action 'self';
```
**Note:** This requires:
- Bundling all dependencies locally
- Removing PlantUML server dependency (use local rendering)
- Removing unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval
### 7.3 Medium Priority Mitigations (P2)
#### CVE-MC-006/008: Window Security Consistency
**Affected Windows:**
- PDF export window (main.js:2579-2585)
- Hidden conversion window (main.js:3263-3268)
**Fix:**
```javascript
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: false,
contextIsolation: true,
sandbox: true,
preload: path.join(__dirname, 'preload-pdf.js')
}
```
#### CVE-MC-007: PlantUML Data Exfiltration
**Options:**
1. Use local PlantUML JAR file
2. Use PlantUML npm package
3. Add warning before sending to external server
4. Allow configuration of PlantUML server URL
---
## 8. Attack Tree Summary
### 8.1 Primary Attack Tree - Full System Compromise
```
GOAL: Full System Compromise via MarkdownConverter
│
├── [BRANCH A] Exploit CVE-MC-001 (nodeIntegration)
│ │
│ ├── [A.1] XSS via malicious markdown
│ │ ├── [A.1.1] HTML injection
│ │ ├── [A.1.2] SVG script injection
│ │ └── [A.1.3] DOMPurify bypass
│ │
│ ├── [A.2] Compromised CDN script
│ │ ├── [A.2.1] jsdelivr compromise
│ │ └── [A.2.2] cdnjs compromise
│ │
│ └── [A.3] PlantUML SVG injection
│ └── [A.3.1] Compromised plantuml.com
│
├── [BRANCH B] Exploit CVE-MC-002 (REPL)
│ │
│ ├── [B.1] Social engineering
│ │ ├── [B.1.1] Malicious tutorial document
│ │ └── [B.1.2] Phishing with "config file"
│ │
│ └── [B.2] Code execution
│ ├── [B.2.1] JavaScript (Node.js)
│ ├── [B.2.2] Python
│ └── [B.2.3] Bash/Shell
│
└── [BRANCH C] Chain Exploits
│
├── [C.1] XSS -> RCE (CVE-MC-003 + CVE-MC-001)
│ └── Impact: CVSS 9.8
│
├── [C.2] Path Traversal -> Privilege Escalation
│ └── Impact: CVSS 8.5
│
└── [C.3] PlantUML -> XSS -> RCE
└── Impact: CVSS 9.1
```
### 8.2 Attack Success Probability
| Attack Path | Complexity | Privileges Required | User Interaction | Probability |
|-------------|------------|---------------------|------------------|-------------|
| A.1 XSS->RCE | Low | None | Required | 75% |
| A.2 CDN Compromise | High | None | None | 15% |
| A.3 PlantUML->RCE | Medium | None | Required | 40% |
| B.1 REPL Social Eng | Low | None | Required | 60% |
| C.1 Combined XSS-RCE | Low | None | Required | 70% |
---
## 9. Recommendations
### 9.1 Immediate Actions (0-30 days)
1. **CVE-MC-001**: Enable `contextIsolation: true` and `nodeIntegration: false` for main window
2. **CVE-MC-002**: Add confirmation dialog before REPL execution with code preview
3. **CVE-MC-005**: Remove `unsafe-inline` and `unsafe-eval` from CSP
4. **CVE-MC-006**: Fix PDF export window security settings
### 9.2 Short-term Actions (30-90 days)
1. **CVE-MC-002**: Implement sandboxed code execution environment
2. **CVE-MC-003**: Enhance DOMPurify configuration, add CSP reporting
3. **CVE-MC-007**: Implement local PlantUML rendering option
4. Add comprehensive security audit logging
### 9.3 Long-term Actions (90+ days)
1. **CVE-MC-010**: Implement dependency pinning and SCA scanning
2. Security awareness training for users
3. Implement secure development lifecycle (SDL)
4. Regular penetration testing schedule
---
## 10. Appendix
### A. Security Configuration Audit
**Main Window (main.js:323-334)**
```javascript
// CURRENT (INSECURE)
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: true, // CRITICAL: Allows require() in renderer
contextIsolation: false, // CRITICAL: No isolation between contexts
spellcheck: true
}
// RECOMMENDED
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: false,
contextIsolation: true,
sandbox: true,
spellcheck: true,
webSecurity: true,
allowRunningInsecureContent: false
}
```
**CSP Configuration (index.html:5)**
```html
<!-- CURRENT (WEAK) -->
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
content="default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net;
...">
<!-- RECOMMENDED -->
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
content="default-src 'self';
script-src 'self';
style-src 'self';
img-src 'self' data:;
connect-src 'self';
frame-src 'none';
object-src 'none'">
```
### B. IPC Channel Security Review
**High-Risk Channels:**
| Channel | Risk | Recommendation |
|---------|------|----------------|
| `execute-code` | Critical | Remove or sandbox |
| `save-file` | High | Add path validation |
| `batch-convert` | Medium | Rate limiting exists |
| `git-*` | Medium | Audit git operations |
### C. Dependency Security
**Critical Dependencies:**
| Package | Version | Known CVEs | Recommendation |
|---------|---------|------------|----------------|
| electron | 37.4.0 | None | Pin version |
| dompurify | 3.3.1 | None | Keep updated |
| marked | 17.0.3 | None | Keep updated |
| mermaid | 11.12.3 | None | Review CSP impact |
---
## Document Control
| Version | Date | Author | Changes |
|---------|------|--------|---------|
| 1.0 | 2026-03-15 | Security Team | Initial threat model |
---
*This threat model should be reviewed and updated after any significant architectural changes or at minimum annually.*
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